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I. International Conventions
A. HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS
The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the Hague Adoption Con-
vention.' The Convention is aimed at ensuring that intercountry adoptions are made in
the best interests of children and preventing the abduction, sale of, and traffic in children.
The Convention entered into force for the United States on April 1, 2008. The Conven-
tion imposes duties on both the sending and receiving States. The sending State must
determine that the child is eligible to be adopted. It must also decide whether there has
been sufficient opportunity for the child to be adopted in its country of origin and that the
adoption is in the child's best interests. The receiving State must decide whether the
potential adopting couple is suited to adopt and whether the adopted child is eligible to
immigrate to the receiving State. The Central Authority for the United States is the
Office of Children's Issues in the U.S. Department of State.
B. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION
As of March 1, 2008, the State Department's Office of Children's Issues became the
primary contact for cases of children abducted both to and from the United States. The
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children had been the primary contact for
incoming cases prior to then.2
The United States accepted the accession of Costa Rica to the Hague Abduction Con-
vention, and it went into force between the two countries on January 1, 2008.
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1. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions,
May 29, 1993, available at http://laws.adoption.com/statutes/hague-convention-on-protection-of-
children.html.
2. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Authorities, http://www.hcch.net/in-
dex-en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
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Japan has indicated its intention to become a state party to the Hague Abduction Con-
vention. This will likely still be some years away, however, due to the required broad
changes to its family code and development of implementing legislation.
C. THE 1996 HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW,
RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN
There is some impetus on the part of the State Department to move towards ratifica-
tion of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforce-
ment and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility, and Measures for the
Protection of Children, concluded October 19, 1996 (the 1996 Convention). The Secre-
tary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law's (ACPIL) Study Group
on the 1996 Convention held public meetings on December 7, 2007, and April 28, 2008,
focusing on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition and Enforcement, and Coop-
eration. The purpose included descriptions of what obligations adoption of the 1996
Convention would impose on the United States if it ratified the treaty, how the treaty
would benefit U.S. families, what specific children's issues the treaty would address, how
they could be implemented in the United States, which state or federal laws would be
affected, and which state and federal authorities could provide assistance in cooperating
with particular requests under Chapters I and V. Currently, fourteen states and one non-
member state are parties. Particular benefits of the 1996 Convention are reinforcement of
the 1980 Abduction Convention and rules for recognition and enforcement of custody
determinations.
HI. International Litigation
A. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION
As usual, most of the international family law cases in the United States involved the
1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its
implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. 3 This treaty
has more ratifications and accessions than almost any other treaty concluded under the
auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 4
An interesting issue regarding abductions which took place before the acceptance by the
United States of Peru's accession, and which continued after the acceptance, was decided
in Viteri v. Pflucker.5 The court held that the Convention did apply to wrongful removals
or retentions occurring after the Convention enters into force separately in each State, but
3. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2006).
4. Although widely adopted, numerous state parties are not in compliance with the treaty. See U.S. DEP'T
OF S-rATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WIrTH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON TIlE CMvL ASPECTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL CIILD ABDUcTION, (Apr. 2008), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/
2008HagueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf
5. Viteri v. Pflucker, 550 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. I11. 2008).
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before the Convention enters into force between the States. Nothing in the Convention
or its drafting history implies or indicates that a State must be accepted by others to
become a contracting State. Therefore, an application for return related to removal or
retention does not have any effect in a contracting State until that individual contracting
State has accepted the acceding State. An application can be made, however, for the re-
turn of a child abducted before the treaty enters into force between the two countries, so
long as it occurred after each country ratified the treaty and the treaty is goes into effect
between the two countries.
The Convention operates to return children to the State from where they were taken so
that State can determine issues of custody and visitation. In order to obtain a return
order, the petitioner must prove that the child was abducted from the country of the
child's habitual residence, that the petitioner had "a right of custody" under the law of the
abducted-from State, and that the petitioner was actually exercising those rights, or would
have exercised those rights but for the abduction. Jurisdiction is appropriate in cithcr
federal or state court.
1. Habitual Residence
Because the Abduction Convention does not define the term "habitual residence,"
courts have had to determine this "fact-based" issue in a number of cases. In a major
opinion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the parental intent test for changing the child's habitual
residence as set out by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes.6 The Sixth Circuit held that
habitual residence is the place where the child has been physically present for an amount
of time sufficient to be acclimatized to a degree of settled purpose from the child's point
of view. 7 But a mother cannot turn a nine-week visit to the United States into an almost
seven month stay and then claim that the child is acclimatized in the United States so as to
shift habitual residence.8 The court noted that the respondent cannot take advantage of
the time-lapse in which she led the petitioner to believe that she was planning on re-
turning to Australia to claim that the children have become "acclimatized." It would be
fundamentally unfair, the court said, to allow the respondent to retain the children in the
United States, without their father's consent and then claim in court that the children
have grown accustomed to their new surroundings. In another case involving Australia
and the United States, a mother who moved with the children to Australia to see if her
marriage could be saved, did not change the children's habitual residence because she
purchased a round trip ticket, kept most of her finances in North Carolina, the children
never became acclimatized to Australia, and she had a prior order from a North Carolina
court awarding her custody.9
In determining habitual residence, a Pennsylvania district court determined that it
should look at how the child's presence in the foreign country fits within the larger picture
of the history of this couple and the child. 10 An Illinois federal district court held that the
children's habitual residence did not shift from the United States to Belgium even though
6. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
7. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007).
8. See Clarke v. Clarke, 2008 VL 2217608 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2008).
9. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 2008 WL 4129507 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2008).
10. Mikovic v. Mikovic, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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they lived there for three years because the father had promised the family that they would
move back to the United States after he finished his schooling." A mother's reservations
about moving to Germany with her husband and children did not prevent the child's
habitual residence from shifting to Germany because the family had taken all steps neces-
sary to abandon their old habitual residence; the mother's removal of the child three years
after the move was wrongful. 12 Therefore, when it appears that the parents intended to
stay in the new State indefinitely in connection with the father's employment, habitual
residence shifts from the United States to the new State.13
2. Rights of Custody
German law gives both parents a right of custody, and therefore a father's removal of a
child, even with the consent of the German authorities, is considered wrongful. 14 A Colo-
rado district court adopted the minority view and held that a ne exeat clause confers a
right of custody on the non-custodial parent."5
In an unusual case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an Alabama state court's ne exeat
order forbidding a minor child's mother, a native of the Netherlands, from removing her
child from its jurisdiction pending its decision in a custody dispute with the child's father,
a native of the United States, did not constitute a "retention" within the meaning of the
Convention It was undisputed the child had been in the mother's physical custody since
his birth, and she still had physical custody of the child after the order was entered. The
Convention, the court held, was meant to cover the situation where a child had been kept
by another person away from the petitioner claiming rights under the Convention, not
where the petitioner still retained the child but was prevented from removing him from
the jurisdiction. 16
3. Defenses
a. Settled in New Environment
There are a number of defenses that the respondent may assert to prevent the child
from being returned. One defense is contained in Article 12 of the Convention. It pro-
vides that the judicial authorities of the abducted-to country need not return the child if
more than one year has elapsed between the abduction, or retention, and the filing of the
petition for return and the child is settled in the child's new environment.
In cases involving this defense this year, one court determined that a child is settled in
her new environment because she is performing two to three age levels above her own
age, is well liked by her peers at day care, and has a strong core of friends and many
relatives in Washington. 17 Another court, however, held that a child cannot be well set-
tled in its new environment when neither the mother nor the children have legal alien
11. Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 2008 VVL 239150 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2008).
12. McClary v. McClary, 2007 WL 3023563 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2007).
13. See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2008).
14. See In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
15. Lieberman v. Tabachnik, 2008 WL 1744353 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2008).
16. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282 (1lth Cir. 2008).
17. Muhlenkarnp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Wash. 2007).
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status and are subject to deportation at any time.' 8 On the question of whether an illegal
alien can be well-settled in the United States, an Arizona federal district court determined
that a child cannot be settled because he is an illegal alien, has no 1-94 form and, even in
the absence of the Convention, is subject to removal from the United States.' 9
It should be noted that the "well settled" defense can only be considered if the petition
for return is filed more than one year after the removal or retention of the child.20 A
current controversial issue concerning this provision is whether the one year period can be
tolled if the abducting parent has secreted the child during that period of time. According
to the Ninth Circuit, the one year period can be equitably tolled when the abducting
parent hides the child in order to ensure the left-behind parent cannot file within the one
year period.21
b. Preference of the Child
A second defense is provided in Article 13. The child need not be returned if the child
objects to being returned and has attained an age and maturity where it is appropriate to
take account of the child's views. A federal district court in Florida determined that a
thirteen year old girl did not need to be returned to Argentina because she was an ex-
tremely bright and mature thirteen year old who persuaded the trial court that she en-
joyed life in the United States and would have better opportunities there. 22
The federal district court in Oregon denied a father's petition to return the child to
Hong Kong where the child, age twelve at the time of filing, but thirteen by the time of
decision, was found to be of sufficient age and maturity. Based on a report and testimony
of a psychologist, and an in camera interview with the child, the trial judge concluded the
child had thought out her decision carefully, was not subject to the undue influence of
either parent, and had decided to remain in Oregon. 23
c. Grave Risk of Harm
A final defense is contained in Article 13(b) and provides that a child need not be re-
turned if the child would be subjected to a great risk of psychological or physical harm if
returned. The respondent is required to prove this defense by clear and convincing evi-
dence.24 In 2007, the Sixth Circuit in Simcox v. Simcox, 25 determined that a grave risk of
harm existed to a four-year-old child and an eight-year-old child if returned to their father
in Mexico. The father engaged in repeated physical and psychological abuse of the mother
in children's presence. Also, the evidence established that four of the five children in the
family were abused and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Simcox stressed three
factors in determining whether there is a grave risk of harm to the child: if the nature of
the abuse is serious, if the abuse happens with extreme frequency, and if there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that it will occur again absent sufficient protections. Upon remand the dis-
18. Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
19. Valverde v. Rivas, 2008 WL 4185831 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008).
20. See In re A.V.P.G., 251 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008).
21. Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2008).
22. Leites v. Mendiburu, 2008 WL 114954 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2008).
23. Man v. Cummings, 2008 WL 803005 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2008).
24. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §.1 1603(e)(2)(A) (2006).
25. Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2007).
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trict court determined there were no undertakings that would protect the children if they
were returned to Mexico.26 Simcox was followed in Di Giuseppe v. De Giuseppe,2 7 when the
court refused to return children to Canada because the court was certain the mother
would abuse her children before a court in Canada could address the issue.
The Eleventh Circuit held that a grave risk of harm to a wrongfully removed child
existed based on evidence that the father's violent temper and abuse of alcohol would
expose the son to a grave risk of harm if were he to be returned to Australia. The court
was not required to find that the son had previously been physically or psychologically
harmed. Nor was the respondent required to prove that the social services agency would
be unable to protect the child because that requirement is not authorized by the Conven-
tion and would present extreme difficulties of proof.28 On the other hand, the First Cir-
cuit determined that there was no grave risk of harm in returning the child when the
undertakings that the trial court had ordered, and which were agreed to by the husband,
could alleviate any concerns about returning the child. 29
California decided that when children have been removed by the civil authorities from
their mother in Germany, it is error to award her temporary custody pending the chil-
dren's return to Germany.30
4. Enforcement
A decision of a court in the Netherlands finding that the mother had wrongfully re-
moved the children was entitled to be recognized in the United States. 31 But, a decision
of a Spanish court awarding custody of the child to the mother did not have to be recog-
nized in the United States because the decision was in violation of the Abduction Conven-
tion. 32 Because the Spanish decision could not be recognized, the petitioner's
incarceration for civil contempt for violating the order directing her to return her child
from Spain was not in violation of laws or treaties of the United States. Thus, her habeas
petition was appropriately denied. 33
A mother's request that an order directing her to return the child to Venezuela be
stayed was properly denied even though she argued that the president of Venezuela was an
anti-American activist who would not honor any request from the United States, since she
failed to show how the "bizarre anti-American ruminations of the President of Venezuela
are relevant" to this case. 34 An oral settlement agreement reached between the children's
parents in front of the court is enforceable in the father's case for the return of the chil-
dren to Italy.35
26. Simcox v. Simcox, 2008 WL 2924094 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2008).
27. Di Giuseppe v. De Giuseppe, 2008 WL 1743079 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2008).
28. Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (1lth Cir. 2008).
29. Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2008).
30. In re Marriage of Witherspoon, supra note 14.
31. Diallo v. Bekerneyer, 2007 WL 4593502 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007).
32. Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2008).
33. Id.
34. Vale v. Avila, 2008 WL 2246929 (C.D. Ill. May 29, 2008).
35. LoCasto v. LoCasto, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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5. Other Issues Under the Convention
A federal district court in Colorado held it had the authority to appoint an attorney to
represent a respondent in a Hague abduction proceeding if it is apparent to the court that
a pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it.36
The pendency of state court custody proceedings between divorced Israeli citizens, one
of whom lived in the United States and the other of whom lived in Israel, did not support
the district court's abstention under the Younger doctrine. The purpose of the Hague
Convention, according to the Eighth Circuit, is to determine whether jurisdiction over a
custody dispute was properly placed. Given that the custody determinations had been
obtained from a state court and from an Israeli court, the district court was uniquely
situated to adjudicate whether Israel or Missouri was the children's habitual residence.
Furthermore, the Hague Convention issues were not properly or fully raised in state
court. 37 In a state court, a proceeding to obtain the return of a child under the Abduction
Convention can be joined with a custody action. 38
A Virginia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of a father seeking review of two state
court orders in a Convention return case under the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine,
finding him a fugitive from justice after two orders of civil contempt were lodged against
him. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. 39 The parties had been residing in Spain for
eleven months when the mother took the child to Virginia to reside with her parents. The
father, a Mexican citizen, filed a petition for return under the Hague Convention in the
juvenile court, and after a hearing, the court ordered that the child return to Spain in the
care of the Petitioner. Five months later, on de novo review, the circuit court vacated the
prior order and issued a new order requiring the father to bring the child back to Virginia.
Following a first and second show cause orders for contempt, the father refused to return
the child to Virginia, and did not personally appear at the second contempt hearing. He
then appealed the order of vacatur and both contempt orders. The court found a connec-
tion between the father's fugitive status and his appeal and granted the mother's motion to
dismiss the appeal.
6. Other International Child Abduction Issues
On February 1, 2008, new passport issuance regulations went into effect.40 To submit a
U.S. passport application for children under the age of sixteen, both parents must consent,
and minors must appear in person. The application must include evidence of child's U.S.
citizenship, that these are the parents or guardian, and show a valid form of personal
identification. The parents are required to sign and take an oath before an authorized
passport acceptance agent. If the other parent does not show to sign, the appearing parent
must further show evidence of a state court judgment showing that they are the sole legal
custodian of the child or show notarized written consent of the other parent. The apply-
36. Lieberman, supra note 15.
37. Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844 (8th Cit. 2008).
38. In re JJ.L.-P., 256 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008).
39. Sasson v Shenhar, 667 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2008).
40. See Passport Application-Minors, 22 C.F.R. § 51.28(a)(3)(ii)(E) (2008).
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ing parent may also explain why the other parent's consent cannot be obtained. Other
rules pertain to guardians.
B. OTHER CASES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW LITIGATION
1. Premarital Agreements
A 1974 premarital agreement drafted in Germany providing for the couple's property
division is valid in New York when it was signed before a notary in Germany and the
parties acted in accordance with the agreement throughout their marriage. 41
In a dissolution of marriage case, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling that (1) the mahr provisions of an Islamic marriage contract were unenforceable
under the Establishment Clause of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits judicial en-
forcement of a contract for a religious act (payment of the mahr); and (2) the conditions
under which the parties entered the marriage contract rendered it unenforceable as a pre-
nuptial agreement. 42 While residing in Ohio, Zawahiri was presented with a form Islamic
marriage contract where the mahr and deferred mahr were negotiated just two hours prior
to the marriage ceremony, after guests had arrived. Thereafter the parties lived apart and
accumulated no marital assets, and eventually Zawahiri filed to dissolve the marriage. Al-
wattar argued the $25,000 deferred mahr in the nikah was a valid prenuptial agreement,
and should be enforced as such. The trial court refused to enforce the mahr on the two
grounds stated above. Alwattar's argument that the mahr should have been enforced as a
general contract was not properly preserved and not reached.
2. Marriage
New York determined that a Canadian marriage between two New York residents of the
same sex was entided to be recognized in New York, and that therefore a community
college improperly denied spousal health care benefits to the couple. The appellate panel
noted specifically that New York had never enacted a "little-DOMA" law.43 A New York
trial court, in a divorce action arising out of a same-sex marriage entered into in Canada,
determined that the best interests of the children warranted granting custodial rights to
the non-biological, non-adoptive mother, since the biological mother held out the non-
biological mother as a parent to the world and children. The children were given the
non-biological mother's last name and birth announcements presented the non-biological
mother as a parent of the children. The extended families of each party were encouraged
to treat the non-biological mother as a parent. Additionally, the biological mother ac-
cepted health insurance and financial contributions from the non-biological mother for
the children. 44
Louisiana determined that a foreign marriage between first cousins, valid where con-
tracted, was valid in Louisiana and not a violation of a strong public policy. This ruling
relating to the marriage in Iran of Iranian citizens, who were later domiciled in Louisiana,
also raised issues about the status of international relations between the United States and
41. Stawski v. Stawski, 843 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
42. Zawahiri v Alwattar, 2008 WL 2698679 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008).
43. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
44. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).
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Iran. The Family Court judge ruled that because of the poor state of those relations, he
would not give any recognition or comity to any marriage or any document originating in
Iran, which he referred to as being "an enemy of the United States."45 The Court of
Appeals, however, noted that foreign documents are governed now by statute, not comity,
and that the statute provides the means for admission of foreign documents such as this
marriage certificate.46
3. DIVORCE-Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Divorce
The following cases demonstrate that in the absence of statutory recognition guidelines,
the inquiry by the state court is a fact specific one.
The divorce that a husband obtained under Islamic religious law and secular Pakistani
law, by performing talaq, would not be afforded comity in Maryland because the foreign
taiaq divorce provision was contrary to Maryland public policy. Under Islamic religious
law and secular Pakistani law, only a husband had an independent right to utilize talaq, and
a wife could utilize it only with the husband's permission. This was contrary to Mary-
land's Equal Rights Amendment. The court determined that the talaq procedure lacked
any significant due process rights for the wife. The court also held that acceptance of the
silence of the Pakistani marriage contract, regarding the division of property, as a waiver
of the wife's rights to marital property acquired during the marriage, would conflict with
Maryland's comprehensive statutory scheme designed to effectuate a fair division of prop-
erty acquired by parties during a marriage.47
A husband was permitted to proceed with his civil marital dissolution action in New
York, despite the parties having earlier received an Israeli divorce which had been predi-
cated on an Orthodox Jewish divorce (Get). The New York court held the Israeli divorce
was not entitled to recognition because the process by which it was obtained circumvented
the constitutional and statutory marital dissolution scheme of New York.48
New York will accord comity and recognize a "customary divorce" terminating a "cus-
tomary marriage," both performed in Ghana, as long as jurisdictional circumstances would
lead a court in Ghana to recognize it, but if the "customary divorce" did not address the
parties' financial rights and obligations, that action could be maintained in New York.49
A California court decided it was not required to recognize a 2002 Turkish divorce
under either the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act or international comity. The parties
married in 1996 in California and again in Turkey in 1998. The parties had consented to
the 2002 Turkish divorce, but the translated judgment did not mention the California
marriage and did not resolve rights and obligations that arose from that marriage. There-
fore, wife's dissolution action in California was proper.50
A New York trial court recognized a divorce obtained by the parties in the Ukraine in
1996 based on prior acts and acknowledgment of the parties, and dismissed a dissolution
action filed by the former wife in 2008 on that recognition, estoppel and claim preclusion.
45. Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 736 (La. App. lst Cir. 2008).
46. Id.
47. Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008).
48. Tsirlin v Tsirlin, 866 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).
49. T.T. v. K.A., 867 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).
50. Lee v. Aydemir, 2008 WL 4606572 (Cal. App. Oct. 17, 2008).
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Significant acts of the parties included a failed appeal of the Ukranian decree and an
agreement to compromise an action for dissolution filed by former husband in 2004 by
reciting the existence of the 1996 divorce.51
4. Property Issues
Washington held that a divorce court that has in personam jurisdiction over the parties
may divide their interests in property that is located in Poland because there is a difference
between jurisdiction to adjudicate personal interests in real property, which is a transitory
cause of action and jurisdiction to adjudicate legal title in real property which must be
brought where the land is located.5 2
Washington also held that a trial court acted within its discretion in applying the doc-
trine of comity to carry out orders of a British Columbia divorce court disposing of land
within the state. In issuing an ejectment order against the tenant-in-common former hus-
band and awarding possession of the property to the former wife for sale, the trial court
also noted that the Canadian decision was fair and that no other alternative made sense.
After sale of the property, the trial court would have discretion to transfer the proceeds to
the Canadian court's registry for disposition.5 3
5. Children's Issues
Numerous cases show state courts apply the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to international custody disputes, and In re Marriage of Will-
son 54 supplanted a Hague Abduction Convention remedy.
A Michigan court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA even though
the mother and child have moved to Canada because the father exercises significant
parenting time with the child in Michigan and therefore Michigan retains jurisdiction
under section 202 of the UCCJEA.55 By the same token, a father may not modify a
Taiwanese custody order in Texas when the mother and child still live in Taiwan and that
country has not relinquished jurisdiction.56
An Illinois trial court was affirmed when it exercised its discretion to allow a mother to
exercise her visitation rights at her home in the United Arab Emirates. The father argued
that because the UAE was not a party to the Hague Abduction Convention, he would not
be able to enforce his custody order. The court noted that the father had previously been
able to obtain some legal recourse in the courts of the UAE, and the mother had agreed
that the child should reside in the United States.5 7
A trial court was without basis to impute to an Egyptian father income of $680 per week
based on New Jersey wages, as the father was not voluntarily underemployed by virtue of
his returning to Egypt where he earned $86 per month. The trial court could not impute
income to the father based on New Jersey wages, since that amount bore no relationship
51. Vartsaba v. Vartsaba, 873 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).
52. In re Marriage of Kowalewski, 182 P.3d 959 (Wash. 2008).
53. MacKenzie v. Barthol, 173 P.3d 980 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
54. In re Marriage of Willson, 2008 WL 2790492 (Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 2008).
55. White v. Harrison-White, 760 N.W.2d 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
56. In reJ.H., 264 S.W. 3d 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008).
57. In re Marriage of Saheb & Khazal, 880 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008).
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to father's earnings or ability to earn money under very different economic circumstances
in Egypt.5
8
The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that the tort of interference with parent-child
relations is recognized in Maryland. A suit can be brought by either a custodial parent or
by a parent who has visitation rights with a child. Here, a father who had custody of one
son and visitation rights with a second son stated claims against the children's mother and
maternal grandmother after the mother and grandmother fled to Egypt with the children.
The punitive damages awarded to the father after a jury trial were not found to be
excessive.59
In a case where a UCCJEA enforcement action affected recovery of a child temporarily
in Wisconsin, but removed from Spain after residing there two years, a California Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of mother's custody petition filed in California state
court just days after she filed the same action in Spain. Her action in Spain was ultimately
dismissed for the mother's nonappearance, and the Spanish case proceeded on the father's
counter-petition to judgment. The mother eventually traveled to Wisconsin and filed
there as well, but the father eventually filed a UCCJEA enforcement there and recovered
the child.60
In a state child protective action, the California Court of Appeals found the trial court
erred when it did not consider whether it had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA in a protective proceeding and released the children to the parents. Although
the children moved back and forth across the U.S.-Mexican border weekly, it appeared
they resided in Mexico. 61
6. Other Cases
Federal immigration law that allows attorney's fees against his or her sponsor to enforce
the sponsor's "Affidavit of Support" is not applicable in divorce cases.
62
58. Ibrahim v. Aziz, 953 A.2d 508 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
59. Khalifa v. Shannon, 945 A.2d 1244 (Md. 2008).
60. Willson, supra note 54.
61. San Diego County HHS v MV, 2008 WL 163019 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008).
62. lannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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